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Abstract 
 
 
Assessments of whose income growth is the greatest and whose is the 
smallest are typically based on comparisons of income changes for income 
groups (e.g. rich versus poor) or income values (e.g. quantiles). However, 
income group and quantile composition changes over time because of income 
mobility. To summarize patterns of income growth while also tracking the 
fortunes of the same individuals, a longitudinal perspective is required. For 
this case, we develop dominance conditions and summary indices for 
comparisons of distributions of individual income growth, together with 
associated methods of estimation and inference. Using these methods and 
data from the British Household Panel Survey, we study individual income 
growth for periods between 1991 and 2005. We show that income growth was 
significantly more pro-poor in the early years of the Labour government than 
in earlier Conservative years. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Statistics about average growth in real income over a period of time such as a year are commonly 
used to assess social progress and receive widespread coverage in the media. However, looking at 
averages does not take account of the fact that some people’s incomes grow more than that of 
others and, indeed, there may be losers as well as gainers. That is, there is a distribution within the 
population of changes in people’s incomes over time. This paper considers how to summarize 
distributions of individual income growth and how to compare distributions for different periods 
of time. We go beyond the pictures provided by averages: our measures incorporate sensitivity to 
the extent to which income growth is greater for poor people than for rich people, i.e. the extent to 
which income growth is progressive or, put another way, pro-poor rather than pro-rich. 
 
There is already research that looks at patterns of individual income growth. These assessments 
are typically based on comparisons of income changes for income groups (e.g. rich versus poor) or 
income values (e.g. quantiles). However, income group and quantile composition changes over 
time because of income mobility. The people who are poor this year are not the same people who 
were poor last year: some leave poverty and others enter. More generally, income groups 
throughout the income range change their composition over time. To summarize patterns of 
income growth while also tracking the fortunes of the same individuals, a longitudinal perspective 
is required. For this case, we show that patterns of income growth are usefully summarized using 
graphs called mobility profiles and cumulative profiles. Moreover, if a profile for period A lies 
everywhere above the profile for period B, then income growth in period A is preferred to that in 
period B. Progressivity-sensitive indices summarizing the amount of growth are also developed 
(with the average as a special case).  
 
Using these methods and data from the British Household Panel Survey, we study individual 
income growth for periods between 1991 and 2005. Our substantive results complement existing 
examinations of patterns of income growth and distribution change under different governments, 
specifically the Labour government that took office in May 1997 and the Conservative government 
that it replaced. We show that in the early years of the Labour government (1998–2002), income 
growth was more progressive than in the preceding Conservative years (1992–1996 and 1995–
1999), but it was not so later in Labour’s term of office (2001–2005). 
 
There are ready explanations for the pro-poor nature of individual income growth in the 1998–
2002 period. On the one hand, the economy was buoyant, with unemployment rates continuing to 
fall relatively rapidly from their early-1990s peak. On the other hand, the Labour government had 
an explicit anti-poverty agenda, unlike the preceding Conservative governments. Labour aimed to 
both raise employment rates by increasing the rewards to work relative to not working (‘work 
first’) and to help low-income working families (‘making work pay’), thereby also reducing 
poverty rates especially child poverty rates. The introduction of Working Families Tax Credit in 
1999 is an example of these policies. Why the progressive nature of income growth declined 
between 1998–2002 and 2001–2005 is an interesting question. We conjecture that the answer has to 
do with the slow-down in the economy from around 2000. 
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1 Introduction
The income distribution in each year can be characterized as a Parade of Dwarfs and a few
Giants (Pen, 1971). Each individual in the population is represented by a person who has
a height proportional to the individual’s income, and these representatives are lined up
in order of height with the shortest at the front. Income growth over time corresponds to
changes in the heights of Parade participants. There is typically a distribution of changes
– there are winners and losers – a feature that is missed by a focus on the average growth
rate. This paper considers how to summarize the distribution of individual income growth
and to assess changes over time, and also provides empirical evidence for Britain on these
topics.
The most commonly-used way of assessing the distribution of income growth is to
compare incomes at a series of common points in the Parades for different years, e.g. at
the deciles or vingtiles of each Parade. Growth incidence curves, graphs that summarize
these calculations, are commonly used in development economics (Ravallion and Chen,
2003) and have also been used to summarize income growth in the UK (see e.g. Joyce
et al., 2010, Chapter 3). There is also a substantial literature developing indices of the
pro-poorness of income growth: see the review by Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009).
The UK’s official statistics on the personal income distribution, Households Below
Average Income, provide information from this repeated cross-section perspective. For
example, over the four years between fiscal years 1994/95 and 1998/99, income growth
was relatively homogeneous across the middle half of the distribution, at a rate of around
10%. At the tails, the experience was quite different: the 5th percentile grew by 3.1%
but the 95th percentile grew by 11.6%. By contrast, over the four years between fiscal
years 1998/99 and 2002/03, income growth was greater the lower the percentile (with
the exception of the 5th percentile). The growth rate was almost 14% at the median and
17% at the 15th percentile, but nearer 10% at the 75th percentile and above. Overall
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, declined slightly.1
As a means of describing who has got better off or worse off, income growth statistics
of the type just described are not fully satisfactory. Looking at the change in the income
of the person at a specific quantile of Parade A and the person at the same quantile of
Parade B ignores the fact that the persons concerned are not the same individuals. Over
time, people change their position in the income Parade. Mobility means that the people
who are poor this year are not the same people who were poor last year: some leave
1Authors’ calculations from Department for Work and Pensions (2008, Table 2.1ts). The data are
derived from the Family Resources Survey, an annual cross-sectional survey. The current HBAI series
began in 1994/95, and the latest year for which statistics are available is 2008/09. The statistics cited
in the text refer to periods that broadly correspond with those used in our own analysis reported later.
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poverty and others enter. More generally, income groups throughout the income range
change their composition over time. To assess whether the individuals who are poor (or
rich) this year are gainers or losers, one has to track the fortunes of individuals not the
fortunes of income groups such as ‘the poor’ or ‘the rich’ whose composition may change
from one year to the next. Longitudinal data are required, as it is only these that enable
one to link the income of a specific individual in Parade A with her income in Parade B,
and hence calculate income growth for each individual.
In this paper, we develop methods that incorporate a longitudinal perspective. We
provide a framework for social welfare evaluations of (changes in) the distribution of
individual income growth, offering dominance results that are based on comparisons of
mobility profiles and cumulative mobility profiles as well as scalar indices. For inference
about changes over time in the distribution of income growth, we use bootstrap methods
for dependent clustered data. The methods are used to analyze the distribution of income
growth in Britain and how it has changed since the early 1990s.
Our substantive results complement existing examinations of patterns of income growth
and distribution change under different governments, specifically the Labour government
that took office in May 1997 and the Conservative government that it replaced. (Cf.
the comparisons by Joyce et al. (2010) using the repeated cross-section perspective.) We
show that in the early years of the Labour government income growth was more progres-
sive than in the preceding Conservative years, but it was not so later in Labour’s term of
office.
We discuss potential explanations for the results in the concluding section but, for
now, we note that statements of distributional goals have been made in terms of individual
income growth as well as poverty and inequality reduction. Indeed, when asked in 2001
whether it was acceptable for the gap between rich and poor to get bigger, Prime Minister
Tony Blair responded stating that ‘the issue isn’t in fact whether the very richest person
ends up becoming richer. The issue is whether the poorest person is given the chance that
they don’t otherwise have’, and ‘the most important thing is to level up, not level down’.2
This is a statement supporting individual income growth as an income mobility concept.
Positive growth is seen as good and negative growth as bad though, interestingly, Labour’s
Prime Minister expresses no strong support for greater income growth by the poorest
persons relative to the richest persons. How to summarize and compare distributions of
individual income growth when incomes may either rise or fall, while also incorporating
a range of potential views about the social value of progressive income growth, is the
subject of this paper.
2Interview on BBC Newsnight, 5 June 2001: transcript at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
events/newsnight/1372220.stm.
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Section 2 develops methods for analysis of distributions of individual income growth
from a longitudinal perspective, and contrasts them with conventional repeated cross-
section methods. Our data, derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
including the measure of income, are described in Section 3. We develop methods of
estimation and inference in Section 4. Our main empirical results are presented in Section
5. Section 6 investigates potential biases introduced by measurement error and sample
ageing, and shows that accounting for them does not change our conclusions. (Details
are provided in Appendices A and B.) Section 7 contains a summary and conclusions.
2 Evaluating distributions of individual income growth
This section considers how to derive welfare assessments of distributions of individual
income growth. For evaluations of distributions of income levels, there are well-known
results that demonstrate the equivalence between orderings of distributions according to
increasing concave functions of incomes, configurations of quantile functions (Saposnik,
1981) and generalized Lorenz curves (Shorrocks, 1983), and orderings by classes of scalar
indices of social welfare that are essentially ‘inequality-adjusted’ means (Jenkins, 1997,
Gruen and Klasen, 2008). For comparisons of distributions of individual income growth,
we develop relationships between social evaluation functions defined over bivariate income
distributions, configurations of mobility profiles and cumulative mobility profiles, and
orderings of classes of scalar indices of individual income growth that are essentially
‘progressivity-adjusted’ means.
2.1 Progressivity-sensitive evaluations
Most generally, a social evaluation function for patterns of individual income growth can
be written W (H) where H is the joint distribution function of two positive random vari-
ables X and Y describing incomes in years t and t + τ ; H(x, y) = Pr[X ≤ x, Y ≤ y].
This is also the starting point of much of the literature on the measurement of income
mobility, reviewed by inter alia Maasoumi (1998), Fields and Ok (1999a), and Jenk-
ins and Van Kerm (2009). An important lesson from that literature is that ‘mobility
is multi-faceted’ (Fields, 2006, p. 123) and that ‘[t]he multidimensionality of the notion
of mobility makes it impossible to devise a fundamental axiom that would unify all ax-
iomatic enquiries that pertain to mobility measurement’ (Fields and Ok, 1999b, p. 463).
Different measures encapsulate different mobility concepts and can lead to different mo-
bility orderings in practice (Fields et al., 2002, Checchi and Dardanoni, 2003). Individual
income growth is one of the many mobility concepts: it is a form of ‘income movement’
to use the language of Fields and Ok (1999b).
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For assessments of distributions of individual income growth, we propose an evaluation
function W (H) with the following properties. The first is that W (H) is the sum of
individual-level income growth evaluations, U (x, y;H), each of which summarizes income
growth for a person with income x in year t and y in year t+τ . U (x, y;H) may be positive,
zero, or negative, since an individual’s income may rise, stay the same, or fall over time.
In other words, social evaluations are individualistic and additive, as commonly assumed
in the income inequality and poverty measurement literatures. We allow U to depend on
the overall bivariate income distribution function H, so that the evaluation of a person’s
income growth may depend on the incomes of other individuals in the population.
A second property is replication invariance (Fields and Ok, 1999b, p. 463), again as
used in the inequality and poverty measurement literatures: comparisons of two distri-
butions are independent of the size of the populations. These first two properties imply
that the overall social evaluation is a per-capita average:
W (H) =
∫ z+
z−
∫ z+
z−
U(r, s;H)dH(r, s) (1)
where [z−, z+] is the support of X and Y .
The third property concerns the specification of U . We propose that the individual-
level growth evaluation function for each person is given by the product of a component
summarizing how much growth the person experiences (assessed in a manner common
to all individuals) and a social weight that depends on the person’s income in the base
year. (This way of specifying an evaluation function follows Chakravarty (1984).) The
aggregate evaluation function (1) can therefore be written as
W (H) =
∫ z+
z−
∫ z+
z−
ω(r)δ(r, s)dH(r, s) (2)
where the social weight is ω(x) > 0, and δ(x, y) is the ‘growth distance function’ com-
mon to all individuals. Assuming also that
∫
ω(x)dFX = 1, where FX is the marginal
distribution of base-year incomes, makes W (H) a weighted average of individual income
growth.
Additional properties of W (H) arise from further assumptions about the two com-
ponents of U (·). As we are describing income growth, we suppose that the growth
distance function is directional. Fields and Ok (1999b, p. 460) define this to mean that
δ(x, y) = −δ (y, x) and also δ(x, ρx) > δ(x, x) for all ρ > 1, where δ (·) is a continuous
function. We also introduce the normalization δ (x, x) = 0. These conditions ensure that
positive income growth for an individual corresponds to a social improvement (W (H)
increases) and negative individual income growth corresponds to a reduction in W (H),
ceteris paribus. We also assume that the growth distance function respects either scale
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invariance or translation invariance: δ (λx, λy) = δ(x, y) or δ (x+ η, y + η) = δ(x, y),
respectively. In our empirical application, we focus on two specifications. The first is
log(y) − log(x) which is the case of proportionate income growth; the second is y − x
which is the case of absolute income growth.3 In conjunction with the other properties,
scale invariance of δ (·) implies scale invariance of W (H), and translation invariance of
δ (·) implies translation invariance of W (H).
The final property is a social preference for progressive income growth. This says
that the impact on W (H) of an increment to δ (·) is greater (or no smaller), the lower
the individual’s income in the base year (t): ω′(x) ≤ 0. Giving greater weight in the
evaluation to initially-poorer individuals is consistent with, but not exactly the same as,
a social preference for greater equality in final-year (t + τ) incomes than in base-year
(t) incomes. Greater equality in final-year incomes is guaranteed only if the pattern of
income growth does not lead to re-ranking of individuals between the two years that is
sufficiently large to offset the progressive income growth (Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2006).
An important reference point is ω(x) = 1, for all x. This is the boundary case of neutrality
towards differential income growth: W (H) is then simply the population average of the
individual-level growth statistics, which we write for brevity as δ. If δ (λx, λy)= δ(x, y),
it is the Fields and Ok (1999b) index of directional income movement with c = 1.
An alternative but equivalent expression forW (H) is useful for subsequent discussion.
Since H(r, s) = FY |X=r(s)× FX(r) where FY |X=x is the cumulative distribution of final-
year incomes conditional on base-year income x, we can rewrite (2) as
W (H) =
∫ z+
z−
(∫ z+
z−
ω(r)δ(r, s)dFY |X=r(s)
)
dFX(r) (3)
≡
∫ z+
z−
ω(r) E (δ (r, y) |X = r) dFX(r) (4)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p) E (δ (x(p), y) |X = x(p)) dp (5)
where E (δ (r, y;H) |X = r) is the expected (average) income growth for individuals with
a base-year income r. Equation (5) uses the change of variable p = FX(r), so p ∈ [0, 1] is
the normalized rank in the base-year income distribution corresponding to income r, and
x(p) = F−1X (p) is the income corresponding to rank p in the base-year distribution. The
social weight is now written in terms of argument p: it is w (p) > 0, with
∫
w(p)dp = 1.
3These are commonly-used ways of summarizing income growth, but not the only possibilities, e.g. a
parametric class of scale-invariant growth distance functions is (2β/β)(yβ−xβ)/(x+y)β , β 6= 0, which is
the ‘arc percentage’ divided by 100 in the case β = 1. A translation-invariant class is (21−γ/γ)[exp(γy)−
exp(γx)]/[exp(γx) + exp(γy)], γ 6= 0. The limiting cases of β = 0 and γ = 0 are the proportionate and
absolute growth distance functions cited in the text.
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For brevity, we refer to the conditional expectation as m(p) and rewrite (5) as:
W (H) =
∫ 1
0
w(p)m(p) dp. (6)
Thus, instead of writing the aggregate evaluation in terms of a weighted average of
the individual evaluations, we can express it equivalently in terms of weighted averages
of expectations of individual-level income growth conditional on position in the base-year
income parade, m(p). We use this alternative representation when discussing mobility
profiles below.4
2.2 Income mobility profiles and dominance relations
We now show that unambiguous orderings of pairs of distributions of individual income
growth according to social evaluation functions with the properties just discussed corre-
spond to dominance defined in terms of mobility profiles and cumulative mobility profiles.
A mobility profile is the plot of m(p) against p, given a definition of δ (·).5 The
mobility profile reveals how income growth is distributed according to position in the
base year income distribution. If income growth – assessed using m(p) – is the same for
everyone, the profile is horizontal. The mobility profile has negatively-sloped sections
over the ranges of p where individual income growth decreases as p increases (progressive
income growth); and the profile has positively-sloped sections over the ranges of p where
individual income growth increases as p increases (regressive income growth).6
Cumulative mobility profiles are plots of the average income growth for people with an
initial income at or below a given percentile x(p) in the base-year distribution, i.e. among
the poorest 100p percent. That is, one plots
1
p
∫ p
0
m(q)dq (7)
against p ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting graph plots areas below the mobility profile – analogous
to the way that a generalized Lorenz curve shows areas below a quantile function. The
slope of the cumulative mobility profile may be positive or negative at different p values.
The cumulative profile’s height at p = 1 is δ.
We may now state two results concerning comparisons of distributions of income
growth. For proofs (using integration by parts) and further discussion, see Van Kerm
4Most income mobility indices, regardless of mobility concept, can be written in the form shown by
equations (3)–(6) (Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2009, Van Kerm, 2009).
5See Van Kerm (2006, 2009) for further discussion and illustrations. The mobility profile is an example
of a fractile graph (Mahalanobis, 1960). Grimm (2007) independently proposed a similar device.
6Classical measurement error and transitory variability in incomes impart a negative slope to mobility
profiles. We return to this regression-to-the-mean issue in Section 6.
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(2006, 2009). We consider comparisons between period A which refers to income growth
between year t and year t+ τ , and period B which refers to income growth between year
s and year s+ τ . Assessments are made using the evaluation functions described earlier:
the comparison is of W (HA) and W (HB) for periods A and B.
Proposition 1 (Mobility profile (first order) dominance) LetmA(p) andmB(p) de-
note the mobility profiles for periods A and B respectively. mA(p) ≥ mB(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] if
and only if W (HA) ≥ W (HB) for any W with w(p) > 0.
Proposition 2 (Cumulative mobility profile (second order) dominance) Let C(p) =∫ p
0 m(q)dq. CA(p) ≥ CB(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] if and only if W (HA) ≥ W (HB) for any W with
w(p) > 0 and w′(p) ≤ 0.
Mobility profile dominance states that finding the profile for period A is nowhere
below and somewhere above the profile for period B is equivalent to the distribution of
individual income growth for A being preferred to the distribution for B for any non-
negative social weight function w(p). Cumulative mobility profile dominance states that
finding the cumulative profile for period A is nowhere below and somewhere above the
profile for period B is equivalent to the distribution of individual income growth for A
being preferred to the distribution for B for any positive non-increasing weight function
w(p).
A corollary of the results is that profile dominance also provides orderings for evalua-
tion functions specified in terms of incomes (ω(x)) rather than normalized ranks (w(p)):
equations (3)–(5) show that W (H) can be written in alternative ways, and the ‘change
of variable’ employs a monotonic non-decreasing function FX which preserves the two
dominance conditions.
These dominance results are fundamentally different from those used by Fields et al.
(2002) and Chen (2009) to study income movement. Both they and we define profiles
in terms of individual-level functions (δ (·)). The crucial difference is that they rank
individuals from lowest to highest on the horizontal axis according to δ (·) values, whereas
the ranking in our case is by base-year income position. (Their graphical checks use
Lorenz and generalized Lorenz curves of income movement statistics.) Income ‘movement’
(growth) in our case can be negative, not only zero or positive, and we build in a social
preference for progressive growth.
Our mobility profile dominance results are related to those developed by Bourguignon
(2010) also to study income growth patterns. The essential difference is that Bour-
guignon defines social welfare over the bivariate distribution of base- and final-year in-
comes, whereas we evaluate the distribution of income changes while incorporating a
potential concern for progressive growth. While Bourguignon’s specification of the social
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evaluation function is more general than ours in principle, his dominance results refer
only to comparisons of bivariate distributions for periods A and B that have exactly
the same base-year income distribution. This is a substantial restriction as it rules out
analysis of changes in patterns of income growth over time or differences across countries.
Base-year distributions that differ are the norm. In contrast, our methods are applicable
to this case, as we illustrate later in the paper.
2.3 Indices of progressivity-adjusted growth and return-to-progressivity
Mobility profile dominance provides robust but only partial orderings of distributions of
income growth with respect to the evaluation function W . Complete orderings by scalar
indices that incorporate a social preference for progressive growth can be derived with
further assumptions about the social weight function w(·). We refer to these as indices
of ‘progressivity-adjusted growth’.
In our analysis, we employ a class of single-parameter indices W v in which the so-
cial weight function is defined using the rank-dependent scheme that is implicit in the
generalized Gini inequality index (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, Yitzhaki, 1983):
w(p) = v (1− p)v−1 (8)
where v ≥ 1. For all 0 < p < 1, w(p) > 0, and w′(p) ≤ 0 as long as v > 1, so the
dominance results provide orderings for these indices. The larger that v is, the faster
the decrease in the social weight as p increases, and hence the greater the preference for
progressive income growth. If v = 2, weights decrease linearly with p from 2 to 0; if
1 < v < 2, w(p) is concave; and if v > 2, w(p) is convex. If v = 1, W v = δ¯.
W v reflects both levels of income growth and differences between individuals. There
is also interest in summarizing the social return to the progressivity of individual income
growth per se, i.e. the increase in social welfare that arises over and above the average
growth experienced by the population as a whole. A natural index of the return to
progressive growth is Gv = W v − δ. This measure can be interpreted as the difference
between observed average growth and equally-distributed-equivalent growth – the growth
which, if received uniformly by each individual, would yield the same overall evaluation
as the observed average growth were it also received uniformly. The more positive that
Gv is, the more progressive is income growth; negative values correspond to regressive
income growth.
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2.4 Longitudinal versus cross-sectional perspectives
Mobility profiles and cumulative mobility profiles are ‘non-anonymous’ (Bourguignon,
2010, Grimm, 2007) versions of growth incidence curves and cumulative growth incidence
curves. A growth incidence curve (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) is, in our notation, a plot
of δ (x(p), y(p)) against p for p ∈ [0, 1], with δ(x, y) := 100
(
y
x
− 1
)
, x(p) = F−1t (p) and
y(p) = F−1t+τ (p).7 A cumulative growth incidence curve, labelled a poverty growth curve
by Son (2004), shows the change in mean income among the poorest p between two years,
i.e. combinations of δ (x¯(p), y¯(p)) and p, where x¯(p) and y¯(p) denote the mean income
among the poorest p at t and t+τ respectively. Like a mobility profile and its cumulation,
a growth incidence curve and its cumulation may have sections with positive or negative
slopes, depending on the pattern of income growth across quantiles.
Growth incidence curves are based only on the two marginal distributions: income
growth is summarized by changes in quantile values, and so each point on the curve
refers to incomes for different individuals at t and t+τ . By contrast, the income mobility
profile summarizes income changes for the same individual and depends on the bivari-
ate distribution of income. Both the cumulative mobility profiles and the cumulative
growth incidence curves show growth among the poorest p (rather than growth at p) but,
whereas the latter define the poorest p separately according to each marginal distribution,
cumulative mobility profiles define the poorest p according to base-year incomes.
In our empirical application, we contrast the pictures describing patterns of income
growth in Britain that are provided by conventional cross-sectional approach and our
longitudinal approach.
3 BHPS data: definition of income and subsamples
We use data from waves 1–16 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), corre-
sponding to survey years 1991–2006. BHPS wave 1 is a nationally representative sample
of the population of Great Britain living in private households in 1991. Original sample
respondents (including each partner from a dissolved wave 1 partnership) have been fol-
lowed over time and they, and their co-residents, were interviewed annually. Children in
original sample households are also interviewed as adults when they reach the age of 16
years. The BHPS following rules ensure that the sample remains broadly representative
of the population of Britain over time.8
7In our empirical work, we summarize proportionate growth using δ(x, y) := log(y) − log(x) rather
than δ(x, y) := 100
(
y
x − 1
)
in order to provide a direct link with the mobility profile for proportionate
growth. The two definitions result in growth incidence curves of almost identical shape.
8The BHPS is less representative of post-1991 immigrant groups. We do not use data from the
extension samples for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland that began in the late 1990s because it
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To assess whether patterns of income growth have changed over time, we report results
for four periods, i.e. for four values of t for pairs of years t and t + τ . The first period
is 1992–1996 when there was a Conservative government led by John Major. We treat
this period as a baseline against which we contrast three subsequent periods. The second
period is 1995–1999. It began with a Conservative government and finished at the time
the new Labour government (which entered office in May 1997) introduced major reforms
to the benefit system, including tax credits, intending to help low-income families with
children in particular. The third and fourth periods are 1998–2002 and 2001–2005, during
which Labour was in power. Our periods are defined to differentiate between Conservative
and Labour periods, though we are also constrained by the availability of income data
(see below).9
Our analysis is descriptive in nature, aiming to shed light on the distribution of
individual income growth and its progressivity, and how these have been changing over
time. We do not seek to identify causal effects associated with particular policy reforms
or particular governments. These caveats aside, our prior expectation was that income
growth was more progressive under Labour than under the Conservatives. This prior was
formed by the results of repeated cross-section analysis of income growth by, for example,
Department for Work and Pensions (2008) and Joyce et al. (2010) and also by noting the
anti-poverty aims of Labour’s policy reforms at the end of the 1990s (more about these
in Section 7). We are interested to see the extent to which our longitudinal perspective
provides similar or different pictures to the repeated cross-section ones.
Our measure of an individual’s income adheres as closely as possible to the ‘before
housing costs’ net household income definition that is used in the UK’s official income
statistics, the Households Below Average Income series, cited in the Introduction.10
Income is the income of the household to which a person belongs, adjusted for dif-
ferences in household size and composition using an equivalence scale, and expressed in
constant prices. Specifically, income is ‘current net household income’, which is the sum
across all household members of cash income from work, capital income, private and
public transfers, minus direct taxes and occupational pension contributions. The income
reference period is the month prior to the interview or the most recent relevant period,
would require use of complicated probability weighting schemes and the temporal coverage of the data
is relatively short. For detailed discussion of the BHPS and its income data, see Jenkins (2010).
9Our conclusions are are not substantially affected by the specific choices of the periods for which
results are reported. This is confirmed by calculations based on rolling four-year windows for the entire
1992–2005 period (results not reported for brevity).
10BHPS net income data files are an unofficial supplement to the official BHPS release, with 16 waves
currently available. The data are documented by Levy and Jenkins (2008) and Jenkins (2010). Jenkins
(2010) shows that BHPS cross-sectional income distributions closely match HBAI ones. For more details
of the HBAI definition of income, see Department for Work and Pensions (2008).
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converted to a weekly equivalent pro rata.11 Total money income is equivalized using the
modified-OECD equivalence scale, and expressed in January 2008 pounds using a ‘before
housing costs’ price index series supplied by the Department for Work and Pensions.
In order to reduce the potential impact on our estimates of measurement error and
transitory income fluctuations, each person’s income is measured using a three-year lon-
gitudinal average: an individual’s income measure for year t is the arithmetic average of
observed income for years t − 1, t, and t + 1.12 Longitudinal averaging of an individ-
ual’s income smooths out errors and other transitory variation if measurement errors are
classical (see Section 6). Also, to prevent outlier income values exerting undue influence,
analysis throughout is based on samples from which incomes in the top 1% and the bot-
tom 1% have been excluded (prior to taking three-year averages). Trimming of this kind
is common in analysis of income dynamics: see e.g. Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009).
Given these definitions, our sample for estimation of growth over the period 1992–1996
is composed of respondents for whom income data are available for six survey years (1991,
1992, 1993, and 1995, 1996, 1997), and similarly for the other three time periods. The
number of individuals in each subsample is: 6,088 (1992–1996), 6,130 (1995–1999), 5,789
(1998–2002), and 5,451 (2001–2005). Since the BHPS is an on-going panel survey, each of
the four subsamples corresponding to the four periods has an overlapping membership.
If there were no missing data on income, no attrition (or death) and no panel joiners
(by coresidence or birth), each of the four sub-samples would comprise the same set of
respondents observed at different points in time. Although sample overlap is incomplete
in practice, there is dependence between the four subsamples and this needs to be taken
account when calculating the standard errors of estimates. The bootstrap resampling
algorithm that we use to address this is discussed in Section 4.
4 Estimation and inference
4.1 Estimation
Estimation of progressivity-adjusted growth indices, growth incidence curves and poverty
growth curves is straightforward, because they involve standard estimators for concen-
tration indices, quantiles, and incomplete means. We focus on estimation of mobility
profiles.
11The use of a current rather than annual measure of income is standard in Britain. Böheim and
Jenkins (2006) show that the BHPS current and annual income measures provide very similar estimates
of distributional summary statistics.
12The use of three-year averaged income follows Gottschalk and Danziger (2001) and Jenkins and
Van Kerm (2006). Use of single-year non-averaged incomes provides qualitatively similar results to those
reported below.
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Income mobility profiles are examples of fractile graphs (Mahalanobis, 1960). Their
estimation requires estimation of a conditional mean function non-parametrically, a prob-
lem for which a number of alternative estimators are available (Sen, 2005). We use robust
locally weighted regression (LOESS) (Cleveland, 1979). LOESS involves determination of
overlapping local neighbourhoods around each of a series of points p spanning the range
[0, 1], and then using data for the sample observations that fall in each neighbourhood
to estimate mobility profile coordinates by the expected value of δ (x(p), y) at each p,
denoted mˆ(p). Local regression methods are particularly appropriate in this setting be-
cause of their well-known good behaviour near the boundaries of the support of the data,
unlike running mean or standard Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression estimators.
Robust LOESS estimation is a two-stage procedure. At the first stage, the expected
value at p is derived from coefficients fitted using a weighted least squares regression
in which the weights decline with the distance of observations from p and are zero for
observations outside of the neighbourhood:
mˆ(p) = aˆ0 with (aˆ0, aˆ1) = argmina0,a1
∑
i
K
(
pi − p
h
)
(δi − a0 − a1(p− pi))2 (9)
where pi = Ft(yi) is the fractional rank of observation i in the year t income distribution
and δi is a measure of individual income change (as described in Section 2) for observation
i, namely yi − xi or ln(yi) − ln(xi).13 We follow Cleveland (1979) and adopt a tricube
weight function for K(z) = (1 − |z|3)3 if |z| < 1 and 0 otherwise. (Using Epanechnikov
kernel weights led to almost identical estimates.) We estimate mˆ(p) at 25 equally spaced
points over the range of p (0.02, 0.06, ..., 0.98). Local neighbourhoods are defined as
p ± 0.075 so that approximately 15 percent of each sample falls in each neighbourhood
(i.e. h = 0.15).14
The second stage uses the first-stage estimator to derive individual weights that give
less emphasis to outliers. That is, given an estimate of mˆ0(p) as in (9), a robustness weight
for each observation is calculated as ki = Q(ei/6ξ) where Q(x) = (1−x2)2 if |x| < 1 and 0
otherwise, ei = mˆ0(pi)−δi is the residual from the initially fitted curve, and ξ is the sample
median of ei.15 Given the weights, a new, robust, mobility profile estimate is calculated
using the same formula as in (9) except that K(·) is replaced by kiK(·). The second stage
13Observations with tied income values are assigned identical fractional ranks so that estimation results
are independent of the sort order of the data. The mean of the fractional ranks is 0.5.
14LOESS differs from other local polynomial regression estimators (Fan and Gĳbels, 1996) in the def-
inition of the neighbourhood. LOESS uses a nearest neighbour approach that selects a fixed proportion
of the sample around each grid point. Local polynomial regression typically uses a kernel-based neigh-
bourhood of fixed width around grid points. In our application the two approaches are equivalent since
the δi are regressed on ranks pi that are, by definition, uniformly distributed, and so a fixed fraction of
the data falls into neighbourhoods of fixed width.
15Values for mˆ0(pi) at all sample points pi are linearly interpolated from estimates of mˆ0(p) on the 25
grid points.
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can be repeated iteratively but the estimates we report are derived without additional
iterations because preliminary analysis suggested that they had negligible impact. The
robust LOESS procedure further minimizes the potential impact of outlier values (in
addition to the data trimming and income smoothing mentioned earlier).
We estimate cumulative income mobility profiles by numerical integration of the ro-
bust LOESS estimates of the income mobility profiles using a trapezoidal rule (Press
et al., 2007).
A bandwidth h = 0.15 was chosen for estimation of mˆ(p) after experimentation. This
choice is a compromise between not under-smoothing the profiles and not over-smoothing
the cumulative profiles (estimates of cumulative income mobility profiles are smoother
than mobility profiles because of the cumulation process). For consistency’s sake, we
use the same bandwidth for all time periods. Estimates based on other bandwidths are
available on request.
Sample weights are used to compute all estimates. Our four longitudinal samples are
weighted using the BHPS cross-sectional enumerated individual weights of year t+τ . We
do not use the BHPS longitudinal weights because our analysis samples include sample
joiners, and no longitudinal weights are provided for them.
4.2 Resampling-based inference
The sampling variability of our estimates, longitudinal and cross-sectional, is computed
using a non-parametric block (panel) bootstrap procedure, as described by Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, Chapter 11), which accounts for sample dependence that arises from the
longitudinal nature of the data.
Resampling is from the sample of households interviewed in wave 1 of the BHPS. The
full response history (including periods of non-participation if any) over BHPS waves 1–16
of all members of the selected households, plus their descendant split-off households and
all respondents that later joined these households, is then selected to form a bootstrap
replicate of the complete panel from wave 1 through 16. To deal with survey design
features (potentially small stratum sizes in particular), resampling from BHPS wave 1
households is done by cluster (primary sampling unit) within each sample stratum using
the repeated half-sample bootstrap algorithm of Saigo et al. (2001).16 Let Xb denote
one bootstrap replication b of the full BHPS waves 1–16 sample, so constructed. To
preserve the dependence and overlapping membership of the subsamples for the four
periods analyzed, it is only in a second step that subsamples for 1992–1996, 1995–1999,
16The repeated half-sample bootstrap algorithm is also versatile as it has been demonstrated to lead
to valid bootstrap inference with both smooth and non-smooth statistics (Saigo et al., 2001).
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1998–2002 and 2001–2005, are formed from each of the bootstrap replicate Xb of the
full panel (according to the selection rules described above). Denote the replication b
subsample for period (t, t+ τ) by St(Xb).
All of the statistics of interest described in Section 2 (including coordinates of the
(cumulative) income mobility profiles or growth incidence curves at any p) are then
estimated on each replicate subsample St(Xb) with t ∈ {1992, 1995, 1998, 2001} and b ∈
{1, 2, . . . , B}, B = 999. We denote any such estimate θˆbt ≡ θ(St(Xb)). We also calculate
the difference between the θˆbt for each of the three later periods (t, t+ τ) and that for the
baseline period 1992–1996, ∆ˆbt ≡ θ(St(Xb)) − θ(S1992(Xb)). By computing all estimates
for the four sub-periods and the between-period difference statistics using the same sets
of bootstrap replication, we capture the covariances between different measures across
time.
Our B replicates of θˆbt and ∆ˆbt are used to estimate the sampling error of our point
estimates θˆt and ∆ˆt, with the errors calculated as:
sˆ(θˆt) =
√√√√ 1
B − 1
B∑
b=1
(θˆbt − θ¯t)2 (10)
where θ¯t is the average of θˆbt over the B replications. Variability bands are derived from
the largest and smallest vingtiles of the B replications: [ F−1(0.05; θt) ; F−1(0.95; θt) ]
where F−1(α; θt) is the quantile α of the distribution of the B bootstrap replications of
θˆbt . Standard errors and variability bands for ∆ˆt are derived similarly.
We also use our bootstrap replications ∆ˆbt to evaluate the statistical significance of the
sign of the observed changes over time. We do so by computing P(∆ˆt) = Pr[sgn(∆ˆbt) 6=
sgn(∆ˆt)] which we evaluate as
P(∆ˆt) = 1
B
B∑
b=1
1(sgn(∆ˆbt) 6= sgn(∆ˆt)) (11)
where 1(·) evaluates to 1 if the expression in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise. P(∆ˆt)
gives the proportion of bootstrap replications for which the sign of ∆ˆbt is different from
the sign observed in the point estimates ∆ˆt. P(∆ˆt) can be understood as the smallest α
such that (1 − 2α) variability bands for ∆ˆt (as defined above) do not include zero. We
interpret these as giving the probability of incorrectly inferring the sign of the difference
from the sign of the point estimate of the difference.
We adopt similar procedures for assessing the statistical significance of the dominance
relations between (cumulative) mobility profiles. We base our tests of mobility profile
dominance of period A (years t, t + τ) over the period B (years s, s + τ ; s > t), on the
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statistic
MP(t, s) = min
p
[
mˆA(p)− mˆB(p)
]
(12)
and tests of cumulative mobility profile dominance on the statistic
CMP(t, s) = min
p
[ ∫ p
0
mˆA(q)dq −
∫ p
0
mˆB(q)dq
]
(13)
where p takes the values {0.02, 0.06, . . . , 0.98}. Mobility profile dominance for period A
over period B is established if MP(t, s) ≥ 0, and cumulative mobility profile dominance
if CMP(t, s) ≥ 0.
The MP(t, s) and CMP(t, s) statistics are similar to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics
used in tests of stochastic dominance. Adapting the unrestricted bootstrap approach for
stochastic dominance of Maasoumi and Heshmati (2000) to the analysis of mobility profile
dominance, we claim observed dominance relations to be statistically significant at the
100(1− α) percent confidence level if(
1
B
B∑
b=1
1(MPb(t, s) < 0)
)
< α, (14)
that is, if the proportion of bootstrap replications in which dominance is not observed
(where it is observed in the original sample) is smaller than α.17 Cumulative mobility
profile dominance is checked similarly.
5 Patterns of individual income growth in Britain and
their changes over time
In this section, we provide a longitudinal perspective on individual income growth using
the methods developed earlier, and compare the results with the pictures provided by
growth incidence curves.
5.1 Patterns of income growth: the longitudinal perspective
Figure 1 shows income mobility profiles (left) and cumulative income mobility profiles
(right) for the four time periods considered. The top two panels show income growth
in absolute terms (the units are January 2008 pounds) and the bottom two panels show
income growth in proportionate terms (the units are log January 2008 pounds). In all
graphs, vertical dashed lines are used to demarcate the poorest and richest fifths of each
17We are in effect testing a null hypothesis of dominance against an alternative of non-dominance.
Alternative approaches such as permutation tests or restricted bootstrap tests used in stochastic domi-
nance analysis which allow tests of the null hypothesis of non-dominance are difficult to apply here given
the complex dependence of the subsamples compared.
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base-year income distribution.
Mobility profiles are negatively-sloped, broadly speaking, regardless of whether an
absolute or proportionate definition of growth is used, and for each of the four periods
(albeit with a positive slope over some small ranges of p). That is, from a longitudinal
perspective, the pattern of individual income growth is progressive: the lower the rank
in the base-year distribution, the greater the expected income growth. Expected income
growth, absolute or proportionate, is positive for the majority of individuals, but negative
for individuals in the richest fifth in the base year.
The mobility profiles do not differ markedly across the four time periods. No curve
lies completely above another at all values of p, so there is no first order dominance result.
Taking all periods together, the estimates indicate that individuals starting in the poorest
fifth experience an income increase of approximately 10%–20% over the subsequent four
years, i.e. a little more than £25 per week. For those starting in the richest fifth, the
corresponding change is around –5%.
Differences between periods in patterns of income growth are more clear cut when
we consider cumulative income mobility profiles, especially when individual growth is
measured in proportionate terms. The non-intersection of cumulative profiles suggests
second-order dominance results, and unambiguous rankings by all members of our class of
progressivity-adjusted growth measures. In the proportionate growth case, the ranking of
the distributions of income growth for the periods is, from highest to lowest, 1998–2002,
1995–1999, 1992–1996, and 2001–2005. In the absolute growth case, the same ranking
applies except that there is no dominance result concerning comparisons of 2001–2005
with 1995–1999 and 1992–1996: the cumulative profiles intersect in these cases.
These conclusions concerning dominance ignore sampling variability. Figures 2 and 3
show differences between the profile for 1992–1996 and each of the other three profiles,
together with bootstrapped 90% variability bands. In each figure, the top panel refers to
mobility profiles and the bottom panel to cumulative mobility profiles. Figure 2 refers
to the absolute income growth case; Figure 3 refers to the proportionate income growth
case. The other feature that is summarized in each of the graphs is the difference between
periods in overall average individual income growth (the mean of the δi values, δ¯), shown
as a horizontal dashed line. This provides an additional reference point for assessing
change over time (see the discussion in Section 2).
Two features stand out from Figures 2 and 3. The first is the size of variability bands.
They are sufficiently large that, with notable exceptions, differences in profiles are not
statistically different from zero throughout the full range of p. They suggest that not all
of the dominance results cited earlier are statistically significant. (We do not report all
16
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possible pairwise comparisons for brevity.)
The second feature concerns exceptions from the overall picture we have just described.
On the one hand, these concern the comparisons involving 1998–2002 and the experience
of the base-year poorest fifth in particular. Compared to 1992–1996, individual income
growth is greater among the poorest fifth than among richer base-year income groups,
and the variability bands lie above the zero growth reference point: there is first- and
second-order dominance over this restricted range. On the other hand, the cumulative
profile differences provide more clear cut results generally. There is statistically significant
second-order dominance: the difference curves and associated variability bands lie above
zero at all values of p. These patterns lead us to conclude that individual income growth
was distinctively more progressive – and more pro-poor, specifically – in the 1998–2002
period than in 1992–1996. The comparisons between each of the other two periods and
1992–1996 do not stand out in this way. We can say that average growth was higher
in the late 1990s period and lower in the early 2000s than in 1992–1996, but sampling
variability prevents us from drawing definite conclusions about changes over time.
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We now put numerical flesh on the patterns revealed so far. The upper panel of Table 1
reports, for each period, average income in the initial and final years, and average income
growth over the period for the population as a whole. (The average growth estimates are
estimates of the progressivity-adjusted growth index W v with v = 1, i.e. δ.) The lower
panel reports, for each statistic, the difference between the value for each of the three
later periods and the 1992–1996 reference period. Corresponding estimates are shown
in the middle and right-hand panels for individuals who were in the poorest fifth or the
richest fifth in the relevant base year.
Table 1 confirms that average income growth for the population as a whole increased
in each period, and in both absolute terms (from $15 to $25) and proportionate terms
(from 5% to 8%) until 1998–2002. Income growth then fell to a level similar to that for
the initial reference period; indeed, to a lower level in the proportionate growth case ($13
or 3%).
In every period, those who started in the poorest fifth had larger income gains than
average (e.g. $33 compared to $15 in 1992–1996), and substantially larger gains than
those who started in the richest fifth who experienced negative income growth in all
periods (e.g. −$18 in 1992–1996). The contrasts between the income change of the
poorest and richest fifths were largest for the 1998–2002 period. This is a manifestation
of the greater progressivity of income growth that we highlighted earlier. We summarize
this progressivity using the progressivity-adjusted growth indices Gv shortly.
The greater income gains for those starting in the bottom fifth are not sufficiently large
to enable them to catch up with the richest fifth but the gap between them is reduced
substantially. The ratio of the mean income of the richest fifth to the mean income of
the poorest fifth in the base year ranges from 3.93 (425/108 in 1992) to 3.40 (490/144 in
2001) whereas the final-year ratios of mean income for the same two groups range from
2.87 (407/142 in 1996) to 2.60 (470/181 in 2005). Put differently, initial mean income
differences between the richest fifth and the poorest fifth are reduced by approximately
a quarter because income growth is progressive.
These calculations summarize income changes for groups defined by base-year income
position, but income groups change their composition over time. Information about
the prevalence of changes in income group composition is provided in the two columns
labelled ‘% move’ in Table 1. The statistics show the proportion of individuals in a base-
year income group (poorest fifth; richest fifth) that are not in that group in the final year.
There is an interesting symmetry: in each period, the fraction of individuals moving from
the poorest fifth, or moving from the richest fifth, is the same – around one third. This is
a relatively large proportion, and its size underscores the potential importance of taking
a longitudinal perspective.
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Income growth patterns are summarized further in Table 2 using our progressivity-
adjusted growth indices (W v) and return-to-progressivity indices (Gv). Estimates for
each period are shown in the top panel of the table, with the absolute growth measures
to the left and proportionate growth measures to the right. We vary the progressivity-
sensitivity parameter v from 2 (linear Gini-like weights) to 4 (placing greater weight on
gains for initially-poorer individuals). It turns out that all the estimates of W v suggest
the same trend over time. Progressivity-adjusted growth in every period was higher in
each period than the preceding one, except in the final period when it fell. This was also
the trend shown by the ‘mean growth’ estimates reported in Table 1 – these correspond
to the case W 1.
Summaries of the differences in indices (relative to 1992–1996 values) are shown in the
bottom panel of the table. The middle set of differences estimates, for 1998–2002, cor-
respond to the case for which we found statistically significant second-order dominance.
For this period, the difference in each index is large compared to the corresponding dif-
ference for other periods, and the associated ‘p-value’ is very small. Varying v makes
little difference to the estimates. For each v, income growth is about £12, or 5%, and
larger in 1998–2002 than in 1992–1996. The lack of variation in the difference estimates
with changes in v is also a feature of the comparisons for the other two periods. Ob-
serve, however, that the estimated differences involving 2001–2005 are near zero and lack
statistical significance, whereas the corresponding estimates for 1995–1999 are positive,
though consistently statistically significant only in the absolute growth case.
The larger estimates of W v for 1998–2002 partly reflect the greater average growth
in this period reported in Table 1 and partly reflect greater growth progressivity. The
estimates of Gv isolate the latter component. The return-to-progressivity is positive
for all periods, and significantly so. But the differences in Gv between periods are less
marked. It is only for 1998–2002 and for the proportionate income growth case that Gv
is significantly greater than for 1992–1996. With v = 2, the return to progressivity is
some 2% larger in 1998–2002 than in 1992–1996, and thus accounts for about 40% of the
total welfare difference calculated using W 2.
5.2 Patterns of income growth: the repeated cross-section perspec-
tive
Figure 4 shows growth incidence curves (left) and cumulative growth incidence curves
(right) for the same four time periods. For consistency, we use the longitudinal sub-
samples to calculate these.18 The graphs in the top panel show income growth in abso-
18Repeated cross-section estimates derived from cross-sectional subsamples are very similar to the
estimates reported here.
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lute terms; those in the bottom panel show income growth in proportionate terms (i.e.
growth incidence curves as conventionally defined). Figures 5 and 6 summarize differ-
ences between curves for 1992–1996 and those for the three later periods, together with
bootstrapped variability bands. There are contrasts with and similarities between the
patterns of income growth shown in these figures and those derived using a longitudinal
perspective.
Broadly speaking, the mobility profiles shown in Figure 1 have a negative slope for
both absolute and proportionate growth definitions, whereas the growth incidence curves
shown in Figure 4 have a positive slope in the absolute growth case, and are flat or
negatively-sloped in the proportionate growth case. Put another way, in the absolute
growth case, the growth incidence curves indicate that the rich experience greater income
growth than the poor over each of the four four-year periods, but the mobility profiles
indicate that income increments are greater for the poor than the rich. How can these
findings be reconciled? The answer is that, over each of the periods, most of the increase
in income at the top percentiles is due to income gains by individuals who did not belong
to the top income group in the base year but did so in the final year. Similarly, those at
the bottom who experienced substantial income growth left their fellow poor behind, and
were replaced in the final year by people who were not among the poorest initially. This
is the marked extent of reranking in the income Parade over time that we documented
earlier.19
The principal similarities between the repeated cross-section and longitudinal per-
spectives are that differences in patterns of income growth are more easily distinguished
from the cumulative graphs and, related, the orderings of the periods is similar. As with
the mobility profiles, the growth incidence curves for different periods tend to overlap.
With cumulation, the distinctive nature of the distribution of income growth over the
1998–2002 period in particular becomes strikingly apparent: the cumulative growth inci-
dence curve for that period lies above the corresponding curves for the other three periods
in both the absolute and proportionate growth cases. This is a second-order dominance
result which also implies greater poverty reduction over the 1998–2002 period than the
other ones, for all standard additive poverty indices and regardless of the generosity of
the poverty line (Son, 2004). The pro-poor nature of income growth over the 1998–2002
period is particularly marked. In contrast, the curves for the other three periods intersect
with each other.
Of course, these conclusions need modification when sampling variability is taken into
account. Again there are parallels with the results from the longitudinal perspectives.
Variability bands are relatively large and, in many of the pairwise comparisons of periods,
19For further details, see Jenkins (2011, Chapter 5).
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one cannot conclude that differences are statistically different from zero at all values of
p. However, the differences between 1998–2002 and 1992–1996 are clearly positive and
statistically significant, underlining the conclusions drawn in the last paragraph. In this
case, the positive growth for the initially poorest fifth is also greater than the positive
growth experienced by the population as a whole on average.
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(a) Absolute growth incidence curves
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(b) Cumulative absolute growth incidence curves
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(c) Proportionate growth incidence curves
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(d) Cumulative proportionate growth incidence
curves
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Figure 4. Growth incidence curves: income growth by percentile
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income); bottom panel shows propor-
tionate growth (change in log real income).
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6 Sensitivity analyses
This section summarizes a number of analyses undertaken to investigate whether our
conclusions about patterns of income growth and their temporal changes are sensitive to
different treatments of measurement error or to changes across periods in the relationship
between income and age.
6.1 Regression to the mean and measurement error
It might be argued that the negative slopes of our income mobility profiles are simply
due to regression to the mean. The reasoning is that if there is classical measurement
error (errors uncorrelated with the true value and over time), then the expected income
increase for someone with a below-average income is positive and is negative for someone
with above-average income.20 Hence, some of the observed progressivity in income growth
evidenced in the income mobility profiles may be spurious. Our use of a three-year income
average aims to reduce the impact of this problem by smoothing out measurement errors
(and transitory variability) so that the economically substantive variations are better
monitored. (As it happens, use of single-year incomes led to broadly similar findings.)
One response to the regression to the mean argument is that it is not so relevant to
comparisons of patterns over time. There is no change e.g. in the BHPS design that leads
us to expect the nature of measurement error to have varied over time. A bias in the profile
slope may be consistent with no bias in the estimated difference between profiles. Another
response to the classical measurement error argument is that, in reality, measurement
error may not be classical. Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) argue persuasively that factors
such as mean reversion in errors offset biases arising from the variance inflation aspect of
measurement error, so that bias in measures of mobility may be negligible.21
Validation data are not available to us to examine this issue, and so our investigations
of the impact of measurement error employed two other strategies. The first is a procedure
analogous to an instrumental variables (IV) approach to reduce the impact of measure-
20An analogy may help. If one rolls a standard die, the expected number of spots at any roll is 3.5
(the sum of the possible scores divided by six). If the first roll in fact produces a 1, then the expected
increase in the score when the die is rolled again is positive (+2.5). By contrast, if a 6 comes up first,
the expected gain at the second roll is negative (–2.5). So, despite there being no association between
the first and the second rolls (the die is fair), there is a correlation between the initial outcome and the
change in outcome.
21Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) fit a measurement error model to linked survey and administrative
record data on the earnings of US men. See also Dragoset and Fields (2006) who use the same data, but
a larger collection of mobility measures, and find that qualitative findings are similar for administrative
and survey data. Quantitative findings often differ more substantially but no systematic pattern is found.
Fields et al. (2003) and Grimm (2007) use a calibrated version of a model similar to that of Gottschalk
and Huynh (2010) to place bounds on the impact of measurement error on estimates of the correlation
between incomes in two years.
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ment errors. The second focuses on samples with more reliably-measured incomes. We
discuss these in turn.
Our ‘IV’ approach uses definitions of income and income growth that break the link
between measurement error in base-year income level and in income growth, thereby
offsetting any regression-to-the-mean driven by classical measurement error. We approx-
imate individual base-year ranks, Ft(yit), by F˜t(y˜it) where F˜t is the distribution function of
y˜it = yit−1 +yit+1. The idea is to use income lags and leads to approximate current period
income and to derive base-year income rankings from this. We consider income change
of the form δ (yit, yit+τ ;H) where yis is income for year s (not a three-year smoothed
average). These definitions imply that no data are used simultaneously to determine
base-year rank and income change; it is as if people’s ranks in the distribution of lag and
lead incomes are used as instruments for their ranks in the distribution of current-year
income.
Estimates employing the instrumented base-year ranks are presented in Appendix
Figures A1, A2, and A3. The results are similar to those reported earlier. There is
clear progressivity of income growth: mobility profiles remain negatively sloped.22 The
estimated trends over time are also reassuringly similar to those reported earlier, includ-
ing the distinctive pro-poor nature of the 1998–2002 period. All dominance results are
maintained, with similar levels of statistical significance.
Our second strategy is to recalculate our estimates using subsamples for which we
believe incomes are better measured. The first subsample is our main sample but ex-
cluding individuals belonging to a household in which at least one person is in full-time
self-employment. The second subsample drops instead individuals belonging to house-
holds with income components imputed by BHPS staff because of item non-response.
(We also employed a third subsample excluded both individuals in households with self-
employment and also those with imputed incomes, but subsample numbers were pro-
hibitively small.) Self-employment income is notoriously difficult to capture reliably in
surveys. Imputations lead to measurement error because of prediction error: to the ex-
tent that income is imputed in the final or initial year of a period, imputation is likely
to lead to error in measurement of income change over time. One issue with the sub-
sample strategy is that it can lead to substantial reductions in sample size. For example,
dropping individuals from households with self-employed workers (in either the base or
final year of each period) leads to reduction in sample size of about 20%–25%. Dropping
individuals in households with imputation of at least one major household income com-
22The curves are somewhat steeper than in our baseline estimates, but note that the income change
reported here is not based on 3-year smoothing. Comparable estimates not based on 3-year smoothing
and without proxying base yeear rank are substantially steeper, as expected.
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ponent reduces the sample by up to 75%–80%. As a result, we increased the bandwidth
used to derive the income mobility profile to h = 0.2 for the ‘no self-employed’ subsample
and to h = 0.3 for subsamples excluding imputed data. Estimates for each of the two
samples are shown in Appendix A.
Excluding self-employed households leads to no substantial change in results. Pro-
files are not markedly flatter (except for very high p). The main difference is that the
growth distribution for 2001–2005 period is now ranked above that for the 1992–1996
period (using the absolute income change definition), but differences remain not statisti-
cally significant. When observations with imputed incomes are excluded, mobility profiles
remain negatively-sloped but they become much flatter. Nevertheless, our general conclu-
sions about trends remain valid, although statistical significance is now weaker: standard
errors increase when sample sizes are substantially reduced.
In sum, the various checks suggest that our substantive conclusions are robust to the
treatment of measurement error.
6.2 Age-adjusted estimates
There may be a concern that income growth patterns, and differences in them between
periods, partly reflect the ageing of the sample. Incomes vary systematically with age
(on average) and so, if the age composition of the sample changes over time, part of
the change in the distribution of income growth may reflect this phenomenon. The
BHPS design is intended to preserve representativeness and minimize the possibility of
the sample ageing (through its following rules, and post-hoc using weights). However, to
the extent that these intentions are not met and, more generally, to reassure ourselves
that sample ageing is not driving our results, we have also computed our estimates using
‘standardized’ samples. These are samples in which the age structure of the 1992–1996
subsample is imposed on all three later subsamples.23
Standardisation is implemented by reweighting subsample observations so that the
age distributions for each subsample are the same as the distribution in the first of the
four periods. The reweighting factor for observation i with age ai in the subsample for
the later period beginning in year s is defined as
pii(s) =
Pr( a = ai | t = 1992 )
Pr( a = ai | t = s ) (15)
where Pr( a = ai | t = s ) is the relative frequency of observations with age ai in the
subsample for period (s, s+τ). Using Bayes’ rule, the reweighting factor can be expressed
23This is similar to the technique of ‘direct standardisation’ that is commonly used in demography.
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equivalently as
pii(s) =
Pr( t = 1992 | a = ai )
Pr( t = s | a = ai )
Pr( t = s )
Pr( t = 1992 ) (16)
where Pr( t = s ) is the proportion of observations from period (s, s + τ) in a pooled
sample of 1992–1996 and period (s, s + τ) observations, and Pr( t = s | a = ai ) is the
proportion of period (s, s + τ) observations in this pooled sample given age equal ai.
The reweighting factors are then multiplied by the sample weights and applied in all
computations for periods other than 1992–1996. We estimated reweighting factors using
expression (16) with the conditional probabilities computed from a probit model in which
the covariates represent a linear spline in age with knots placed at ages 5, 12, 25, 35, 45,
60, and 70.
The estimates are displayed in Appendix Figures B1 and B2. They show that dif-
ferences over time for age-standardized estimates are virtually identical to the non-
standardized estimates that we presented earlier.
7 Discussion
The thesis of this paper is that analysis of the pattern of income growth, and its changes
over time, should employ longitudinal perspectives to complement conventional repeated
cross-section approaches. It is of interest to know how the incomes of specific individuals
change over time, not only how the incomes associated with Parade positions (income
‘slots’) change over time. There is not a one-to-one relationship between the two per-
spectives because there is substantial reranking of individuals in the income distribution
over time. We have therefore developed longitudinal methods – methods that relate
configurations of mobility and cumulative mobility profiles to unanimous orderings by
aggregate measures of progressivity-adjusted income growth. For statistical inference, we
have applied bootstrap resampling methods that take account of the dependent clustered
samples that are inherent in this type of analysis.
Our estimates for four four-year periods in recent British history suggest that, from
a longitudinal perspective, income growth is generally progressive. Over any particular
period, income growth is greater for those with lower incomes in the base-year distribu-
tion. This is not an artefact of measurement error or sample ageing. This pattern is quite
different from the picture provided by growth incidence curves (a repeated cross-section
perspective): broadly speaking, they suggest that income growth over a four-year pe-
riod has been typically been regressive in terms of absolute income changes though more
distributionally neutral in terms of proportionate income changes.
Within this general picture, the results for the 1998–2002 Labour period stand out
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as distinctively pro-poor, however, relative to both the two preceding four-year periods
(when there was a Conservative government) and relative to the subsequent four-year
period (when Labour continued to form the government).
Our finding concerning the progressive nature of income growth during the early
years of Labour’s administration is fully consistent with earlier analysis which has taken
a repeated cross-section perspective almost exclusively. What we have done is to analyze
income growth patterns in greater detail, triangulating cross-sectional and longitudinal
perspectives, and giving greater attention to the measures used for assessment and issues
such as statistical inference (which turn out to be important) and measurement error and
sample ageing (which do not).
There are ready explanations for the pro-poor nature of income changes in the 1998–
2002 period. On the one hand, the economy was buoyant, with unemployment rates
continuing to fall relatively rapidly from their early-1990s peak. On the other hand,
the Labour government had an explicit anti-poverty agenda, unlike the preceding Con-
servative governments. Labour aimed to both raise employment rates by increasing the
rewards to work relative to not working (‘work first’) and to help low-income working
families (‘making work pay’), thereby also reducing poverty rates especially child poverty
rates. The principal programmes directed at these ends were Working Families Tax
Credit (WFTC), introduced in October 1999, providing means-tested support to low
income working families that was more generous than its predecessor (Family Credit).
(WFTC was itself replaced by the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit programmes
from April 2003.) There were other changes during the period that raised support for
families with children, notably increases in universal Child Benefit, and increases in the
child allowances in Income Support, the social assistance benefit for those not in paid
work. A national minimum wage was introduced in April 1999. To reduce pensioner
poverty, a means-tested minimum income guarantee for poor pensioners was introduced
in April 1999.24 Labour’s policies had significant impacts on the income distribution ac-
cording to microsimulation analysis. For example, Sefton and Sutherland (2005) compare
estimated incomes in 2004/05 under the 2004/05 tax-benefit rules and estimated incomes
in 2004/05 had policies remained as they were in 1997. Their overall conclusion is that
‘the impact of the tax and benefit policies introduced since 1997 imply a significant re-
distribution towards those on low incomes, compared with what would have happened if
the old system has simply been adjusted for inflation’ (p. 244).
Why the progressive nature of income growth declined between 1998–2002 and 2001–
2005 is an interesting question. To us, the smoking gun is the slow-down in the economy
24See inter alia Brewer and Shephard (2004) and Bennett and Millar (2005) for further details of the
policies introduced by the Labour government.
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between the two periods. The rate of decline in the unemployment rate levelled off around
2000 and remained at around 5%, and the annual rate of GDP growth fell from around
4% to 3% (Jenkins, 2011, Chapter 3), and wage growth for full-time employees was much
lower (Sefton et al., 2009, Table 2.1). That is, there was a reduction in the capacity to
deliver additional redistribution. Developing more detailed answers is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the link between redistributive capacity and the state of the economy
is an interesting topic for further research.
Another important topic for future research is closer examination of patterns of in-
come growth for subgroups within the population such as lone parent and other families
with children, pensioners, and so on, and relating these to developments at the population
level. This would provide more descriptive evidence about the identity of the gainers and
losers within a given period. It would also assist development of narratives about policy
reform effects. For instance, Labour reforms were primarily directly at families with chil-
dren and pensioners and so, if it is policy reform rather than the state of the economy that
drives changes in patterns of income growth, one would expect to see differential income
improvements among these groups in particular. The methods developed in this paper
are not ideal for analysis of this kind. What is required are measures of progressivity-
sensitive growth that are decomposable by population subgroup. Our measures are not
decomposable because the measures are contingent on base-year ranks. (The Gini coeffi-
cient of inequality is not exactly decomposable as a weighted sum of subgroup Ginis for
the same reason.)
There is a more fundamental issue related to subgroup decomposability that also needs
to be addressed in the longitudinal context. That is, people move between population
subgroups over time (e.g. with family formation and dissolution); subgroup membership
changes as well as income group membership. Our preliminary work on this topic exam-
ines mobility profiles for each of a number of subgroups taken separately (with subgroup
membership defined by status in the base-year): see Jenkins and Van Kerm (2008). We
find that income growth was especially pro-poor among family types concentrated at the
bottom, notably families with children and pensioners – patterns that are consistent with
the Labour government’s aims to reduce pensioner and child poverty – but the small size
of the subgroups weakens the statistical significance of these analyses.
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Appendix A Estimates with alternative approaches to
measurement error
Appendix A.1 Using lead and lag income to ‘instrument’ current-
year ranks
(a) Absolute income mobility profiles
−75
−50
−25
0
25
50
In
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992−1996 1995−1999
1998−2002 2001−2005
(b) Cumulative absolute income mobility
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(c) Relative income mobility profiles
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(d) Cumulative relative income mobility
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Figure A1. Income mobility profiles with proxied base year rank and no three-year-average
smoothing
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income); bottom panel shows propor-
tionate growth (change in log real income).
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Appendix A.2 Estimates for samples with better measured incomes:
(i) dropping observations in households with a self-employed member
(a) Absolute income mobility profiles
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(b) Cumulative absolute income mobility
profiles
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(c) Relative income mobility profiles
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(d) Cumulative relative income mobility
profiles
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Figure A4. Income mobility profiles (no self-employed subsample)
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income); bottom panel shows propor-
tionate growth (change in log real income).
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Appendix A.3 Estimates for samples with better measured incomes:
(ii) dropping observations with imputed income values
(a) Absolute income mobility profiles
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(b) Cumulative absolute income mobility
profiles
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(c) Relative income mobility profiles
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(d) Cumulative relative income mobility
profiles
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Figure A7. Income mobility profiles (no imputed income subsample)
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income); bottom panel shows propor-
tionate growth (change in log real income).
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Appendix B Age-standardized estimates
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